Engines
According to the already known data on the Sarmat rocket, the development of engines for the first stage is carried out by NPO Energomash named after academician V.P. Glushko (annual report for 2012). The use of the modified propulsion system of the first stage of the R-36M2 Voevoda 15D285 (RD-274) rocket looks quite logical and would save time. The only problem was that the serial production of 15D285 engines in the early 1980s was deployed at PO Yuzhmash, which has now become Ukrainian. And therefore, the production of the newest reincarnation of the Voevoda engines - the PDU-99 / "product 99" propulsion system was entrusted to PJSC "Proton-PM" ("Perm Motors", Perm). In 2013-2016. production of the first engines begins there, and on June 9, 2015, the first debugging firing test of the prototype “product 99” rocket engine took place at the firing stand.
And then further, it is quite likely that there will be problems in setting up the serial production of such a new product. Failure to deliver the first stage engines on time was considered by many experts to be one of the possible reasons for the delayed inrush starts. As you know, during the years 2017-2018. three missile launches not only made a mortar launch from a silo launcher. but they also turned on the first-stage engines - accordingly, already in the course of the throw-in starts, operable engines and a control system for them had to be supplied. At least for the first stage.
Now, for flight tests, it is required to supply not three sets of engines, but twice as many and capable of working not for a few seconds (the duration of the active section during throwing starts), but for standard tens of seconds. It is likely that the task turned out to be more difficult than it seemed earlier and the production could not cope with this task.
However, I may be wrong - the secrecy of information gives rise to the need to make assumptions. I apologize in advance to the engine builders if it's not about them.
In general, NPO Energomash and Perm Motors have a rather strange relationship - they are, as it were, partners in the production of rocket engines. But for some reason, in 2014, Proton-Perm Motors OJSC collects from NPO Energomash as much as 32 million rubles in penalties under contracts from 2008 and an additional agreement from 2012, and later, already in 2019, on the contrary, NPO " Energomash ”is trying to recover from JSC“ Proton-Perm Motors ”already 33 million rubles of penalties for the allegedly undelivered machines, which, by the way, were nevertheless delivered, but with some delays due to the unavailability of the site for their placement. The court rejected the claims of “Energomash” and satisfied only 2.7 million rubles of the penalty. A strange relationship for strategic partners. I suspect that all this could affect those projects that were carried out by this cooperation of enterprises.
Control system
No one modern missile can't fly without a control system - launching all systems, leaving the launch pad or silo, working and stopping the engines of two stages, separating and working of the upper stage, adjusting the velocity vector of each warhead and finally its compartment - this is responsible for this. control system.
Previously, it was believed that the control system for "Sarmat" is being developed by the Scientific and Production Center of Automation and Instrumentation named after Academician Pilyugin, who is the author of the control systems for launch vehicles "Zenith", "Proton-M" and "Topol-M". But a study of the arbitration cases of Russian courts suggests that the main developer of the control system looks like a different one. This is the Scientific and Production Association of Automation named after Academician Semikhatov.
And, apparently, there may be problems with the control system of the new intercontinental missile. On June 7, 2021, a meeting of the Arbitration Court was held in St. Semikhatov to the Research Institute of Command Instruments. The essence of the claim is the requirement to fulfill the obligations of the research institute for the supply of a set of command devices (KKP) and a block of angular rate sensors (RCS), which should have been supplied initially (under the 2015 contract) on December 31, 2016. By an additional agreement of 04.24.2019, the delivery time was changed to September 2019.In October 2019, not having received the desired NPO Automatics, it went to court.
Command instruments are an indispensable part of a modern ICBM control system. With their help, the aiming of the rocket is carried out before launch - the azimuth of the course is set, the rocket receives all the information necessary for guidance. In the general case, the block of angular velocity sensors is also an absolutely necessary component of the control system - this block determines the behavior of the rocket in flight in an unsupported environment - according to the turns and accelerations that it measures. Relatively speaking, this is the cerebellum of a modern rocket.
So, what about the command instruments and the sensor unit? They were assembled and delivered by the performer, although with a delay in time, but they were! 11/16/2019 But the supplied equipment had drawbacks about which the research institute had warned in advance. Indeed, on January 28, 2020 NPO Automatics by letter of proinfThe Institute was informed about the negative result of the acceptance tests of the KKP. After the corrections, the complex of command devices was nevertheless adopted by the NGO, but only on 04/12/2020. And the most important thing: the courts took into account that the parties agreed on a joint decision of 06/09/2020 due to the fact that during the development of the complex of command devices (PSC) on To the technical task for the mid-range of the ROC “Development of a complex of command instruments of the on-board equipment of the control system on the topic“ 001 ”The Institute achieved accuracy characteristics with a deviation from individual requirements of the technical task for the PAC, due to the lack of a domestic element base with the necessary characteristics.
Apparently, for the whole of 2020 and possibly part of 2021, the performers were finalizing the equipment to meet the requirements of the technical task.It is still unlikely that the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia would want to get the most powerful rocket in the world with accuracy indicators 40 years ago. The Strategic Missile Forces are hardly interested in repeating "Voevoda" - they need a better rocket!
Upgrade from the Voenno-boltovoy channel (05 jan 2022, I quote):
This is not the first time in the course of court proceedings, details of the development of advanced weapons have been disclosed. In cases No. A56-8333 / 2020 (https://kad.arbitr.ru/Card/8b8c115c-1982-4e2c-96d2-b98301377429) and A56-46672 / 2021 (https://kad.arbitr.ru/Card / 4dee6d95-5d78-4963-ba76-253024f6ea16) one of the reasons for the postponement of flight tests of the 15A28 missile of the Sarmat missile system, also referred to under the codes “product 001” and “subject 001”, is indicated. Recall that despite the numerous statements of the highest officials, flight tests of this complex have not yet begun. Spoiler alert: the killer butler was assigned the backwardness of the domestic element base and Western sanctions.
From the materials of the cases it follows that the developer of the control system "Sarmat" is JSC "NPO Automatics named after academician N.A. Semikhatov "(hereinafter NPOA). In turn, NPOA ordered the Scientific Research Institute of Command Instruments JSC (hereinafter NII KP) to carry out R&D for the manufacture of a complex of command devices (KKP) and a block of angular rate sensors (RCS), about which the parties entered into an agreement No. 2 / 2-1030 -15 / 787 / Yur. 765 dated 06/02/2015.
This agreement is divided into 12 stages, stages Nos. 1,3,5,7,9,11 provide for the manufacture and delivery of KKP; Nos. 2,4,6,8,10,12 - production and delivery of the ODUS. Thus, NII KP was supposed to manufacture and supply 6 sets of KKP and BDUS for missiles for flight tests (LI products). Some initial dates are mentioned:
stage 5 - 12/31/2016;
for stage 6 - 12/31/2016;
for stage 7 - 03/31/2017;
for stage 8 - 03/31/2017;
for stage 9 - 06/30/2017;
for stage 10 - 06/30/2017.
The original deadlines for the delivery of stages were repeatedly disrupted and postponed by additional agreements to the contract. So, by additional agreement No. 14 of 04.24.2019, the deadline for the execution of stage 5 was postponed to August 2019, the deadline for the execution of stage 6 was postponed to September 2019, and these deadlines were also disrupted - the shipment of the PSC for the 5th stage occurred on November 16, 2019, but the delivered PAC did not pass the entrance control at NPOA and was not accepted by it. The files mention a lot of letters, research reports and conclusions about the need to revise and restore the CCP. As a result, the obligations under the 5th stage of the SRI KP fulfilled only on 04/12/2020, and the deadline for the 6th stage was once again postponed by additional agreement No. 18 from 02/03/2020, now to 02/26/2020, by the same agreement the deadline for the 11th stage was postponed to 11/15/2020.
At the time of the court proceedings, the Research Institute of KP manufactured 3 sets of command devices for completing items LI No. 1,2,3 (stages No. 6,7,8) and a backlog was formed for LI items No. 4,5,6 (stages No. 9,10,11 ). As one of the reasons for the postponement, NII KP refers to the fact that when testing electronic products after the development of design documentation, it became necessary to purchase additional elements of the electronic base (i.e., it was necessary to replace part of the elements - note of the channel). Given the lack of competition in the market for these elements (including due to the imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation), their acquisition required significant time costs, which ultimately led to a delay in the execution of work.
Due to the unsatisfactory progress of work, the parties on 06/09/2020 agree on a joint decision:
"In the course of developing a set of command devices for the gearbox INAYA.402113.130 according to the technical assignment for the midrange of the ROC" Development of a complex of command devices for the control system equipment on the topic "001", accuracy characteristics were achieved with deviations from individual requirements of the technical specifications for the complex of command devices.
Deviations of the achieved characteristics from the requirements of the technical specifications for the complex of command devices are due to the lack of a domestic element base with the necessary characteristics.
Bringing these characteristics to the specified technical specifications for the development of a complex of command devices is possible subject to the development and implementation of an improved domestic element base no earlier than 2022yes. "- in other words, if the improvement of the domestic elemental base does not happen, then the characteristics of the KKP will not be brought up to the initial specifications, either in 2022 or later.
By the same decision, the parties established a number of measures and joint actions for the earliest possible completion of work:
"1. To allow the set of command devices with the achieved characteristics up to GLI 1-3, for which JSC" GRTs Makeeva ", JSC" NPO avtomatiki ", JSC" Research Institute of Command Devices "correct the terms of reference for the set of command devices and the corresponding documentation.
2. JSC "Research Institute of Command Devices" to develop and agree with JSC "NPO Avtomatiki", JSC "GRTs Makeeva", Federal State Unitary Enterprise "4TSNII" MO and DOGOZ, a schedule for introducing a complex of command devices to the level specified by the technical assignment for the development of the KKP.
3. JSC NPO Avtomatiki, JSC GRTs Makeeva, JSC Scientific Research Institute of Command Devices, together with FSUE 4TSNII MO and DOGOZ, make a separate decision on finalizing the complex of command devices and the necessary methods in terms of confirming the main characteristics based on the results of the implementation of cl. 2 of this solution and the results of GLI 1-3.
4. Work on this decision shall be carried out without increasing the cost of the development work. "
Further, JSC "GRTs Makeeva", the main executor of the state contract for "Sarmat", sends the NII KP letter No. 147/1131 dated 04/26/2021 with an attachment in the form of a decision on the procedure for ground-based experimental testing of on-board equipment of the control system. In accordance with the specified decision, the products supplied under the contract are approved for flight tests, taking into account the achieved characteristics (i.e., with a KKP that does not fully meet the initial requirements of the technical specification - approx. Channel). For this reason, the position of the NII KP is as follows: it is not possible to carry out work on stage 11 of the contract until the completion of flight tests. Moreover, according to the additional agreement No. 30 of 08/13/2021, concluded by the parties, the work on stages No. 9 and No. 10 is excluded from the scope of work under contract No. 1118187311572010101000282/2 / 2-1030-15 / 787 / legal 765 dated 06.02.2015 and included in the scope of work under contract No. 1118187311572010101000282/24 / 2-1030-21 / 785 / jur.2051 dated 13.08.2021 under stages No. 1 and No. 2.
Yours Missiles Underground
To be continued
